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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the frequent failure of the debt swaps is not an accident. Instead, it
follows from fundamental forces driven by the market's assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue
relative to the demand for fiscal outlays. It follows from the observation that arbitrage forces
systematically impact prices in asset markets. Ignoring these price adjustments would lead to too
optimistic an assessment of the gains from swaps or buybacks. A by-product of our paper is to
highlight the perils of financial engineering that ignores the intertemporal constraints imposed by
fiscal fundamentals. As a country approaches the range of partial default (either on domestic or
external debt), swaps may not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis
forward. Our methodology combines three independent themes: exchange rate crises as the
manifestation of excessive monetary injections [Krugman-Flood-Garber], the fiscal theory of
inflation [Sargent-Wallace (1981)], and sovereign debt. The integrated framework derives
devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public-finance optimizing problem. We shows
that under conditions similar to those which prevailed in Russia and Argentina prior to their
meltdown, swaps are not just neutral, but could actually make the situation worse and even trigger
a speculative attack. An unsettlingly clear implication of the model is that there may be very few
options left once public debt reaches levels regarded as unsustainable in relation to fiscal
fundamentals. Dollarization only makes matters worse, and pushes the debt write-down option to
the fore. 
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Russia’s 1998 meltdown and Argentina’s, which began in December 2001 and is still 
continuing, have a few notable features in common.  Both count among the spectacular 
macroeconomic crises of the 1990s.  In both cases, unsustainable public debt levels and dynamics 
eventually became the key issue.  Furthermore, in both cases, there was a determined effort to 
save a fixed exchange rate, in the Russian case, a soft peg to the U.S. dollar, and in the Argentine 
case a constitutionally mandated currency-board based hard peg.  Likewise, in both cases, there 
were factors that might have obscured the true underlying dynamics of public debt and 
contributed to an even bigger debt build-up than might have occurred otherwise.  For Russia, 
these would include the real appreciation of the ruble over the three years prior to the crisis, 
which temporarily reduced the burden of foreign currency denominated public debt, and expected 
growth that never materialized.
1  Likewise in Argentina, a growing disequilibrium in the real 
exchange rate after 1997 and the inclusion of large privatization proceeds as current revenues, 




There was yet another point of commonality, the one focused on in this paper: both 
countries attempted sovereign debt swaps with the intention of bolstering liquidity and avoiding 
meltdown.  But even though these swaps, particularly the Russian one, were hailed with 
considerable fanfare and became an integral part of IFI led rescue packages, they did not work 
and might have even have backfired, as discussed below.
3  This paper argues that the failure of 
the debt swaps is not an accident.  Instead, it follows from fundamental forces driven by the 
market's assessment of the scarcity of fiscal revenue relative to the demand for fiscal outlays.  
Indeed, under certain conditions debt swaps may hasten the meltdown.  The argument outlined in 
the paper resembles the one dealing with the limitations of debt buybacks (Bulow and Rogoff 
(1988)).   It follows from the observation that arbitrage forces systematically impact prices in 
asset markets.  Ignoring these price adjustments would lead to too optimistic an assessment of the 
gains from swaps or buybacks.  A by-product of our paper is to highlight the perils of financial 
engineering that ignores the intertemporal constraints imposed by fiscal fundamentals.  As a 
                                                 
1 Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) contain a detailed analysis of the Russian meltdown. 
2 On the first point, see Perry and Serven (2002), on the second, Mussa (2002). 
3 The Russian swap was greeted with considerable and unqualified euphoria – see Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov 
(2001), although there was skepticism voiced about the Argentine swap, which was carried out as a last-
ditch measure.   3
country approaches the range of partial default (either on domestic or external debt), swaps may 
not provide the expected breathing room and could even bring the crisis forward.
4   
 
Our methodology combines three independent themes: exchange rate crises as the 
manifestation of excessive monetary injections [Krugman-Flood-Garber], the fiscal theory of 
inflation [Sargent-Wallace (1981)], and sovereign debt.  The integrated framework derives 
devaluation and external debt repudiation as part of a public-finance optimizing problem. It 
allows re-examining some of the dynamics of crises by combining S-W with KFG.  We illustrate 
the usefulness of this approach by focusing on a narrow issue – the welfare effects of debt swaps.  
Yet, the framework can be used to address other policy issues. 
  
The main results of the paper are as follows.  First, it shows that under conditions similar 
to those which prevailed in Russia and Argentina prior to their meltdown, swaps are not just 
neutral along the lines of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, but could actually make the situation 
worse and even trigger a speculative attack. 
5  This result is developed in the context of a model 
that allows for multiple states of nature.  “Good states” are those where growth and taxes are 
adequate to meet debt service payments, while “bad states” are those where growth and taxes are 
not enough and a devaluation is needed to restore fiscal solvency.  Public debt levels and the 
currency composition are chosen keeping in mind fiscal constraints and inflation aversion, and 
are impacted by the initial debt.  The usual motive for a debt exchange is the high interest 
differential between domestic currency (peso) debt and foreign currency (dollar) debt with a swap 
attempting to lower the share of peso debt.
6  We show that such swaps actually hurt in bad states 
because they lower the base for the inflation tax and require an even bigger devaluation in such 
states.  The rise in the expected level of devaluation then raises both the interest differential as 
                                                 
4 If fiscal fundamentals are strong and public debt sustainability is not an issue, a debt exchange that 
lengthens maturity can be beneficial, as Korea’s experience showed.  In March 1998, Korea managed to 
lengthen its banks’ foreign debt supported by a government guarantee, a move that is credited with 
lowering interest rates and stabilizing the exchange rate.  However, the guarantee would not have meant 
much if fiscal and public debt conditions were weak.  For a description of the exchange see Kim and Byeon 
(2001) and of its impact Chopra et al. (2001) Box 2. 
5 Simply put, the most basic version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem says that in a world of zero taxes, the 
value of a firm depends upon its cash flows and not how these are divided up between debt and equity, i.e., 
the composition of liabilities is irrelevant.  In an ex post review of the Russian case, Stanley Fischer, then 
first deputy managing director of the IMF, expressed skepticism that a “market-friendly restructuring alone 
can fundamentally change a country’s debt dynamics.  Such restructurings take place at market prices, and 
thus almost by definition, do not significantly change the present value of the country’s debt 
obligations….”.  See Comments and Discussion, Kharas et al. (2001). 
6 The Argentine swap was not a currency swap, but a maturity swap designed to lengthen debt.  The 
Russian swap was both a maturity and currency swap.   4
well as the shadow exchange rate – quite the opposite of the intended effect.  Second, the multiple 
state approach used here allows a natural interpretation of IFI-led rescue packages as attempting 
to raise the probability of good states at the expense of bad states.  It thus provides a way of 
integrating first and second generation models with their respective emphasis on fundamentals 
and credit rationing on the one hand  and multiple equilibria and confidence on the other.  Third, 
an unsettlingly clear implication of the model is that there may be very few options and only a 
limited role for IFIs once public debt reaches levels regarded as unsustainable in relation to fiscal 
fundamentals.  Dollarization only makes matters worse, and pushes the debt write-down option to 
the fore. 
 
  The next section presents the Russian and Argentine debt swaps.  This is followed by the 
development of an analytical model and interpretation of the Russian and Argentine experience in 
its context.  The last section concludes.  
 
The Debt Swaps 
 
  We first present the Russian swap and attendant circumstances.  By May 1998, Russia’s 
public debt, which was 50 percent of GDP at the end of 1997, was on a clearly unsustainable 
course.  The marginal composite (ruble plus foreign) real interest rate was 27 percent, while 
growth prospects had been downgraded to zero.  Tax collections had consistently fallen short of 
targets and oil prices were falling.  There were in addition several serious fiscal and structural 
problems that had not been resolved.  Russia’s market indicators took a sharp turn for the worse, 
with spreads on its eurobonds and yields on its ruble treasury bills (GKOs) jumping upwards as 
the Indonesian political and financial crisis erupted in mid-May.  Approximately $11 billion of 
foreign exchange resources (reserve depletion plus new borrowings) had been used in the defense 
of the ruble from November 1, 1997, when the Asian crisis first spilled over, to end-May 1998, 
amounting to 5 percent of post-crisis 1999 GDP.  International liquidity had been depleted, with 
gross foreign exchange reserves having fallen to only 12 percent of GKOs plus broad money by 
May end.  Discussions with the IFIs had been in train throughout the year, and towards the end of 
June, intensified into negotiations on an emergency package, which was announced on July 13.  It 
had three components: : (i) fiscal and structural reforms; (ii) a $22.6 billion financing package 
including an immediate liquidity injection of $5.5 billion (compared to gross foreign exchange 
reserves at the time of about $15 billion); and (iii) a swap out of domestic debt (short-term ruble 
treasury bills or GKOs) into long-maturity dollar eurobonds (the “GKO-eurobond swap”).  The   5
liquidity injection into reserves and swap were meant to ease liquidity pressures and lower 
interest costs, thereby starting a virtuous cycle that by simultaneously relaxing fiscal constraints 
and lowering the probability of devaluation, would reduce ruble interest rates and place public 
debt on a downward trajectory. 
 
Approximately $40 billion by face value and $32.3 billion by market value at prevailing 
exchange rates were eligible under the swap, which was hailed by market analysts as “The Great 
Ruble/Dollar Debt Swap” and as the “most positive aspect of the program”.
7 Those wanting to 
convert would receive an equal amount by market value of 7-year and 20-year dollar eurobonds.  
They were asked to bid by quoting a single spread for both eurobonds, but with a benchmark of 
US Treasury May 2008 for the 7-year bonds and August 2027 for the 20-year bonds.  MOF 
announced a minimum spread of 837.5 basis points.  The bid results were announced on July 20, 
1998. At the maximum spread of 940 bps chosen by MOF, the total face value of eurobonds to be 
issued was $6.4 billion, of which $0.5 billion were new money bonds, and $5.94 billion pertained 
to the GKO swap.
8  The bonds were sold at a steep discount, at a price of 73.8 percent, so that the 
proceeds available for GKO redemptions were $4.4 billion (5.94x0.738).   
 
It thus turned out that there was not much demand for the eurobonds – only $4.4 billion 
worth of GKOs were tendered, compared to $32 billion of ruble debt maturing over the second 
half of 1998. This indicated that the bulk of GKO holders preferred to hold on to 1-4 month paper 
yielding 50 percent or more than swapping into long-term dollar-denominated bonds yielding 15 
percent, indicating concerns about default risk as well as an implicit assessment that the peg 
would last for the next few months.  However, the meltdown occurred less than a month later.   
 
The situation began unraveling soon after the swap was completed, with both devaluation 
and default risk, measured by a decomposition of GKO yields, jumping up sharply.  It was 
discovered that there was no demand from long-term buyers for the eurobonds created by the 
swap; and the large increase in dollar denominated debt interacted negatively with Russian bank 
exposures to Russian government dollar-denominated paper, making them vulnerable to margin 
                                                 
7 MFK Renaissance, “The Great Ruble/Dollar Debt Swap”, Fixed Income Update, July 14, 1998; 
Brunswick Warburg, “Does IMF package mark the end of the ruble crisis?” July 14, 1998. However, the 
risk of unloading a large volume of Russian dollar debt on to a skittish market adding to pressure from sales 
by cash-strapped banks was noted in the MFK Renaissance report. 
8 For comparison, the spread on the 10-year Indonesian eurobond was 160 basis points LOWER than that 
on the 10-year Russian eurobond the day the swap was completed.  Indonesia was at the time in the throes 
of a severe political and financial crisis.    6
calls that required they liquidate their holdings of government debt.  As GKOs were the most 
risky asset, exit intensified, leading to the meltdown. 
 
  The Argentine debt swap was similarly concluded after months of market concern about 
fiscal fundamentals and even outright default.
9  By the end of 2000, public debt stood at 55 
percent of GDP but would have been considerably higher if corrected for real exchange rate 
overvaluation, as very little debt was peso-denominated.  In late 2000, sovereign bond spreads 
were 750 basis points above US treasuries and broke through 1000 basis points by March 2001.  
Market analysts were openly discussing default by late 2000.  A $40 billion IMF package was 
negotiated in December 2000 to stave off default and restore market confidence; but growth 
faltered and by March 2001 the market appeared to have concluded that the fiscal and debt 
situation was not salvageable.  While Argentina had little short-term debt, its  projected financing 
requirements were $22 billion per year over 2001-2005 provided primary fiscal surpluses were 
large enough to stabilize the public debt to GDP ratio – and this would have required primary 
fiscal surpluses of at least 4 percent of GDP, which was not credible given the track record.  
Against this background, a $29.5 billion debt “mega” swap was concluded over June 1-4 2001 to 
extend maturities.  This voluntary swap, which enabled Argentina to postpone over $16 billion in 
debt service payments between 2001 and 2005 – relatively small compared to financing 
requirements of $110 billion - was greeted enthusiastically by investors according to press 
reports.
10  Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the swap was that it was concluded at a spread of 
close to 1100 basis points, whereas calculations showed that at spreads of over 1000 basis points 
Argentina’s debt dynamics were “virtually hopeless”.
11  Indeed, after the swap, meltdown 
proceeded as tax collections continued to flag, bond spreads rose even further and bank runs 
intensified because of concerns about sustainability of the currency-board-based peg.  
 
  Before proceeding to the analytical model, we briefly examine the intuition underlying 
the above swaps.  The one for the Russian swap is more compelling.  With GKO yields at 50 
percent or more and eurobonds in the 13-15 percent range, a $20 billion swap from GKOs into 
eurobonds would save $7.5 billion per year, or about 2 percent of pre-crisis GDP.  This would 
mean a substantial lowering of the fiscal deficit as well as a much improved liquidity index.  The 
                                                 
9 The discussion here is based on Mussa (2002), Perry and Serven (2002) and de la Torre and Schmukler 
(2002). 
10 See, for example, FT.com “Argentina buys time for economy”, by Thomas Catan and Vincent Boland, 
June 5, 2001.  David Mulford, international chairman at Credit Suisse First Boston, was cited as describing 
the swap as a new, market-led solution to sovereign debt crises that other governments would be watching. 
11 Mussa (2002) page 25.   7
remaining GKO holders would feel more confident that their debt would now be serviced, and 
also that their chances of exit into dollars would be better, as there would be a smaller volume of 
GKOs competing for the same amount of reserves.  As noted above, this seemingly plausible 
intuition  turned out too good to be true.
12 
 
  In the Argentine case, there was no prospect of improving the fiscal situation, because 
interest rates rose as a result of the swap.  Liquidity may have temporarily improved, but public 
debt dynamics worsened.  An easy way to see this is by looking at the inter-temporal budget 
constraint: the sum of primary fiscal surpluses discounted by the difference between the real 
interest rate and the growth rate of real output has to at least equal the initial debt to output ratio 
as  a solvency condition.  The rise in the real interest rate as a result of the swap (the price paid 
for lengthening maturity) lowers the present value of the primary surpluses.  Assuming the 
private sector prices the swap so as to at least maintain the debt ratio in a present-value sense, the 
only way out is for fiscal retrenchment or a rise in growth.  The swap does not help with either in 
an obvious manner. 
 
A Simple Analytical Model 
 
The Technical Appendix provides a minimal model, and applies it to the welfare 
consequences of swaps.  We apply the insight of the fiscal theory of the inflation, emphasizing 
the implications of the intertemporal budget constraints in an economy where the inflation tax is 
the residual that adjusts to meet the fiscal shortfalls [see Sargent and Wallace (1981)].
13  We 
integrate Sargent-Wallace’s insight with Krugman-Flood-Garber’s articulation of the conditions 
leading to currency crises, paying attention to the complications added by sovereign debt.   
 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of how the GKO-eurobond swap triggered Russia’s crisis, see KPU (2001). 
13   In their 1981 paper "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic", Sargent and Wallace looked at the 
effectiveness of monetary policy under a regime where a fiscal authority sets a stream of deficits. Hence, in 
their model the fiscal authority (treasury) dominates the monetary authority (the central bank) by imposing 
a deficit stream, which must necessarily be financed by the Central Bank or Treasury.  The monetary 
authority is eventually forced to finance the debt through seignorage. Their analysis gives interesting 
results, showing that it may not be possible for the monetary authority to generate seignorage sufficient to 
cover the debt if the sequence of deficits is either "too big" or "too long".  They also find that the ability of 
the monetary authority to control inflation, given these deficits, is drastically reduced. It is possible for tight 
money to have little effect now, and result in higher inflation later. One of their simulations even reveals a 
case where tight money leads to higher inflation both now and in the future.    8
The model is a two period, a small open economy with a single tradable good.   The 
government can issue short-term debt denominated in domestic or foreign currency.  Hence, the 
public sector finances the first period’s fiscal outlays by taxes, and by domestic and external 
borrowing.  The government collects tax revenue to meet its debt repayment obligations and 
issues money.  Tax revenues in the model correspond to the net revenues available for debt 
servicing after covering some top priority fiscal expenditure, i.e., to the primary fiscal balance.  
Taxes are implicitly distortionary, and we assume that the output cost of taxation is increasing in 
the tax revenue raised for debt servicing. The second period net tax revenue is stochastic.  The 
inflation rate in the second period is solved as part of a public finance problem, where the 
inflation tax responds to the fiscal conditions that the government inherits, and the realized state 
of nature.  
 
The public finance problem solved by the policy maker includes the options of partial 
defaults on internal debt (inflation) and on external debt (debt repudiation).  Both options are 
costly.  The authorities determine the second period inflation and the extent of foreign debt 
repudiation by optimizing a social welfare function.   This objective function is representing 
social preferences that are decreasing in net tax revenue and in the inflation rate.  The government 
has preferences towards price stability, which in the open small economy is equivalent to 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate.
14  Hence, inflation (equivalently, a devaluation) would occur 
only if maintaining price stability is too costly.   
 
The government faces an upper bound on its capacity to tax in each state in the second 
period. The cost of taxation varies with an exogenous state of nature – raising taxes is more 
costly, and the upper bound on feasible tax revenue is lower in worse states of nature.  This 
formulation is based on the idea that output is subject to stochastic disturbances and that the 
marginal cost of tax revenue declines with output. The government enters the first period with a 
given stock of short-term debt and can choose to refinance its debt by exchanging domestic 
currency bonds for foreign currency bonds.  In the second period, the government repays its debt 
after uncertainty regarding the state of nature is resolved. In each state of nature, authorities 
decide whether to abandon the exchange peg, and, if they do, they also choose the ex post money 
supply.  
 
                                                 
14 Such an objective function may characterize a benevolent administration that maximizes the expected 
utility of consumers who demand public services, in an economy where raising taxes is costly.     9
Under sovereign immunity, governments are encouraged to make debt payments by the 
possibility of indirect sanctions for not doing so. These sanctions usually take the form of reduced 
access to foreign trade or international credit markets. In models of sovereign debt, the costs of 
default are limited, so that there are upper bounds on the repayments that a government will 
make. These can be state contingent and lead to debt limits. Models of equilibrium debt 
renegotiation (for example, Kletzer and Wright [2000] or Bulow and Rogoff [1989]) imply that 
debt repayments will be increasing with output. These are game theoretic models with discrete 
punishments for devaluation from equilibrium. A very simple way to incorporate the 
renegotiation or restructuring of sovereign debt repayments is to add a fixed cost of debt 
repudiation. In addition, if the government devalues, it incurs another cost, whether it repudiates 
its debts subsequently or not.  The government chooses the optimal policies in order to maximize 
its objective function, taking into account the costs associated with internal and external defaults 
(devaluation and foreign debt repudiation, respectively).  
 
A detailed analysis of the above model is contained in the technical appendix.  As some 
of the technicalities may obscure the underlying economic forces at work, the text that now 
follows presents a simplified framework.  Specifically, it ignores sovereign risk and assumes, to 
start with, that direct taxes are exogenously given.  These simplifications allow us to provide a 
sharp illustration of the economic forces as work.  The economic insights of this discussion carry 
over to the more general case, as articulated in the technical appendix. 
 
Let D denote the real present value of the debt at the end of period 1, and x the proportion 
of the outstanding debt issued in domestic currency (pesos) at the end of period 1. The exchange 
rate in period 1 is unity and the short-term peso interest rate, i, floats in period 1, so that a debt 
swap is a change in x.  The foreign price level is constant and equal to one. In the second period 
the domestic price level,  in state of nature s, rises at the devaluation rate.  We assume that 
Fisher interest parity holds in equilibrium.  The foreign (dollar) risk free interest rate is r.  This 
means that  
s P
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where there are N states of nature in the second period, occurring with 
probability N s s ≤ ≤ 1 ; φ .   10
The second period government revenue in state of nature s is the sum of net taxes (T ) 
plus seignorage, denoted by
s
σ .  Seignorage revenues are expressed as a function of the price 
level given the state of nature,  ) ( s P σ , by substituting out for the money supply from money 
demand.  If the exchange remains fixed in period 2, then  ) 1 ( ) ( s s P σ σ = .  If   , then the 
price level in state s is determined by the devaluation rate, possibly following a speculative 
attack.  In these circumstances the seignorage revenue may include the international reserves.
1 > s P
15  
Hence, total fiscal revenue is bounded by 
(2)  ) ( s s P T σ +  
We define the state of nature according to the net tax revenue, such that T (where 
the ranking of the states of nature reflects the ranking of net tax revenues, which in turn may 
reflect the ranking of productivity and output).   
n T T < < < ... 2 1
  Recalling that x stands for the share of peso debt and applying Fisher parity (1), for a 
given debt, D, the fixed exchange rate regime is viable in state of nature s if and only if 
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where i and r are linked by (1).  In the fixed exchange rate regime, higher expected inflation 
increases the cost of debt by the expected inflation premium times the share of domestic currency 
debt.   
We start the analysis with a useful benchmark case, ignoring sovereign risk.  The 
aversion to inflation implies that devaluations will take place only in bad enough states of nature.  
Hence, the equilibrium is characterized by a threshold state, where for states of nature below the 
threshold, lower states are associated with higher devaluations (reflecting greater reliance on the 
inflation tax).  In states of nature above the threshold, taxes are plentiful, and there is no need to 
supplement the tax revenue with the inflation tax (hence the exchange rate remains fixed).   
                                                 
15 With a speculative attack, the precise magnitude of the seignorage revenue depends on the policy of the 
central bank.  For example, if the central bank will not use any reserves to defend, then  equals the 
conventional seignorage: the proportionate rise in M needed to achieve money equilibrium at the price 
level .  On the other hand, if the central bank commits part of its reserves, R0, to defense, then 
includes the conventional seignorage plus the reserves committed, R0. 
) ( s P σ
s P
) s (P σ  11
 
To illustrate this, let us ignore for the moment the endogeneity of the seignorage revenue, 
assuming that s s s P σ σ = ) ( .  We will relax this assumption shortly.  Let us denote by j+1 the 
threshold state of nature where debt repayment is sustainable under a fixed exchange rate.  For 
states s, s < j+1,  
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The scarcity of fiscal revenue in these states necessitates devaluation, at rates determined by the 
fiscal solvency constraint: 
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The maximum debt associated with fixed exchange rate regime at the threshold state, j+1, is 
determined by 
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Henceforth we assume that the debt is set at the maximum level consistent with maintaining the 
fixed rate in state j+1.  For states above the threshold, s > j+1, the fiscal revenue is plentiful.  We 
assume that the authorities reimburse this surplus in a lump sum manner. Equations (6) and (7), 
plus the Fisher interest parity condition linking i to r provide us with a system of simultaneous 
equations that determines uniquely the devaluation rates in states s (s = 1, …, j), and the debt.  
The resultant equilibrium is characterized by the following claim— 
Claim 1:  When seignorage revenues are exogenous, a debt swap that reduces peso debt and 
increases dollar debt, i.e., lowers x,  increases the devaluation rates in states below the threshold 
state j+1, but does not affect the equilibrium aggregate debt level or the threshold state.  It 
therefore does not impact the probability of devaluation for a given initial debt level, which 







  We will illustrate this claim by showing that choosing the appropriate increases in 
devaluation in states 1,…, j will suffice to restore fiscal balance in states 1, …j+1 at the initial 
debt, leaving the exchange rate pegged in states j+1, …, N.   
 
First, note that equation (6) can be rewritten as   12
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The first term on the RHS is the return to debt holders in the absence of devaluation, and is 
exactly the same as the RHS of equation (7).  The second term is the capital loss induced by the 
devaluation on holders of domestic currency debt.   Straightforward addition shows that 
∑∑
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1 1 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( σ φ σ φ , i.e., D is independent of x.
16  
 
   Consider now a swap that lowers x.  This will help in states s>j+1 because of the 
premium paid on peso debt in these states but hurt in bad states  ) ( j s ≤ where peso debt suffers a 
capital loss.  Restoration of fiscal equilibrium in all states can be achieved as follows:  applying 
the implicit function theorem to the last term on the RHS of (7) shows that if the return on pesos 












where  is the size of the swap.  Similarly, noting that the first term on the RHS of (6’) 
remains unchanged after peso interest rates rise following the swap as per (8), applying the 
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Equation (9) shows two things: first, the size of the increase in devaluation rises with the size of 
the swap; and second, the worse the state (the higher   is to begin with) the larger the 
devaluation needed to restore equilibrium.
s P
17   
 
                                                 
16 This also implies that D is independent of the Ps’s, which are endogenous to x, while maximal D is 
independent of x. 
17 An alternative way of interpreting the above is as follows: if following the swap, devaluation rates in bad 
states are adjusted according to the rule in (9), then peso interest rates will rise in accordance with (8) to 
restore equilibrium in all the states 1 to j+1.   13
We now turn to the endogenous seignorage case.  Seignorage increases - up to a point 
depending upon the inflation elasticity of money demand - with devaluation.  Therefore, more 
resources are available in the “bad” states and imposing the same structure as earlier, it follows 
that  ( , i.e., the sustainable level of D can 
go up.  Suppose now that a swap is engineered, i.e., x is lowered.  In this case, if for the same 
swap size, the devaluation rule in (9) is applied, surpluses will develop in states 1 to j because 
seignorage will increase.  Alternatively, if a lower rate of devaluation is used, peso interest rates 
will rise by less than indicated by equation (8) so that a surplus develops in j+1.  By continuity, D 
can rise as x falls.  But notice that this also means higher expected inflation, i.e.,  rises.   
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Thus, replacing high nominal interest rate peso debt with low nominal interest rate dollar 
debt is a mixed blessing – it increases debt capacity, but also increases the expected devaluation.  
This in turn would trigger higher domestic interest rate and higher demand for foreign currency in 
period one.  If the supply of international reserves is limited, it may also trigger a speculative 
attack in period one.  In the context of the Flood-Garber-Krugman model, this will be the case if 
the swap increases the shadow exchange rate above the pegged exchange rate in period 1.  More 
specifically, suppose a Cagan demand for money: 
(10)  ] log ) (log [ log log P P E S M s − − = − η , 
where M denotes the relevant fundamentals (supply of money and output), η is the semi elasticity 
of the demand for money, and S is the first period price level.  The shadow exchange rate in such 
an economy would be 













Suppose that prior to the swap, the shadow exchange rate was marginally below unity (= the fixed 
exchange rate).  Attempts to swap domestic currency with foreign currency debt may increase the 
expected future price to levels leading to the eventual collapse of the fixed exchange rate in 
period 1, as would be the case if accomplishing the swap would imply 1
~
> S .  The above 
discussion may be summarized as follows: 
 
Claim 2:  Allowing seignorage revenues to vary with the rate of inflation gives a determinate 
solution for the share of peso debt.  When total debt D is relatively low, the peg may be 
sustainable in all states of nature and all debt can be in pesos.  However, once D crosses a certain 
threshold, further increases in D are associated with falling shares of peso debt and higher   14
devaluation rates in states of nature associated with low tax revenue.  In this case, a swap of peso 
debt for dollar debt (lowering x) will raise total debt, but at a cost – higher expected devaluation.  
Large enough increases in expected devaluation could trigger a speculative attack in period one.
 18 
 
An Illustrative Model for Claims 1 and 2 
Exogenous Seignorage (Claim 1) 
We illustrate Claim 1 with the help of a simple example, with N = 2 and j = 1.  In this 
case, letting  1 1 1 − ≡ P π  and noting that P2 = 1,   (6) and (7) reduce to:  
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where it is assumed seignorage is zero when the exchange rate remains fixed.  For a given 
inflation and aggregate debt, higher peso debt share leads to a fiscal surplus in state 1, and fiscal 
deficit in state 2 because the impact of devaluation in state 1 is proportional to the share of peso 
debt and works in opposite directions in the two states.  A higher devaluation (inflation rate) in 
state 1 reduces the value of debt in that state at a rate proportional to the difference between the 
actual and expected inflation (= the probability of state 2 times state 1 inflation); but increases the 
value of the debt in state 2 at a rate proportional to expected inflation (= the probability of state 1 
times state 1 inflation).   
For a given domestic currency debt x, system (12) solves for the devaluation rate in state 
1 and total debt.  Figure 1 characterizes the solution.  The upward sloping bold curve traces the 
association between devaluation in state 1 and the total debt that solves the fiscal constraint in 
state 1 (equation 12a).  Higher devaluation in that state induces greater capital loses to peso bond 
holders, generating a fiscal surplus, increasing the total debt associated with fiscal balance in state 
1.  The downward sloping curve traces the association between devaluation in state 1 and the total 
debt that satisfies the fiscal constraint in state 2  (equation 12b).  This is the state where the 
exchange rate remains fixed. Higher devaluation in state 1 will increase expected inflation and the 
nominal interest rate, increasing thereby the fiscal cost in state 2 associated with peso debt.  
Hence, it will induce a drop in the total debt associated with fiscal balance in state 2.  The 
                                                 
18 This is bad news for highly dollarized economies such as Argentina.  They can borrow more provided the 
good state probability is high; but once this changes, there may be a much bigger inflationary collapse than 
with less dollarization – or if this is excessively costly, an outright default.   15
equilibrium inflation and the debt are at the intersection of the curves.  Panel a corresponds to the 
case where x =1, whereas panel b corresponds to x = 0.5.  Reducing the domestic currency debt 
share shifts both curves to the right: at a given debt, the lower share of domestic currency induces 
a fiscal deficit in state 1, requiring greater devaluation in order to regain fiscal balance.  The 
opposite happens in state 2 – the drop in the share of domestic debt reduces the capital losses due 
to expected devaluation that does not materialize in state 2, leading to fiscal surplus.  Fiscal 
balance in state 2 is regained at a higher inflation.  The two curves shift to the right at the same 
rate, implying a new equilibrium with the same debt level, but substantially higher devaluation 
rate in state 1 (inflation more than doubles from about 0.25 to about 0.56).   
The intuition behind the above results follows from the inequality:  
(13)  i r
P
i






which basically says that ex post payments on peso debt in state 1 are less than those on dollar 
debt (same in both states) which in turn is less than ex post payments on peso debt in state 2.
19  
This inequality is key to explaining why debt swaps do not work when solvency is a concern.   
 
Endogenous seignorage (Claim 2)  
  In equation (12) a,  1 σ  is replaced with  ) ( 1 1 π σ , which is concave in  1 π , representing a  
seignorage Laffer curve.  Linearizing around an existing fiscal equilibrium and assuming a swap 
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  It follows from (14) that consistent with 
Claim 2, both bad state inflation and total debt go up to restore equilibrium when a swap that 
lowers peso debt (( is engineered.
20   Consistent with Claim 1, total debt remains the 
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20 We assume that inflation is less than the seignorage maximizing rate.   16
same and  1 π ∆  rises to 
x
x ∆








 for a swap of the same size when seignorage is 
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We now illustrate Claim 2 with the help of a two state example (see the Appendix for the 
general case).  Suppose that the second period output is: 
  ,  Y 1 2 = φ . 
Seignorage is assumed to be given by a quadratic function
22 
 (15)  s σ = ;  
where the inflation rate in state s is defined by  1 − = s s P π .  Seignorage is maximized at  
 (16) 
m = π  
To start, let us assume that the tax rate is exogenously set at  .  In these circumstances, tax 
revenue is proportional to productivity, and  
0 t
) 1 ( 2 1 ε − =T T .  Suppose taxes are enough to repay 
debt in state of nature 2 without devaluation (hence, j =1).  If T D r) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 + > −ε , the tax 
revenue suffices to cover the debt in state 1, and there is no need to devalue [set seignorage and 












> 2 T , all the debt can be domestic currency denominated [set x = 1 in 
(12 b)].  The inflation rate in state 1 is determined by the requirement of fiscal sustainability in 
state 1: 
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T , then x = 1 is not feasible -- it would impose a too high fiscal cost 
in state 2 – recall inequality (13).  In these circumstances, x and π1 are determined by the 
following system: 
                                                 
21This expression is exactly the same as equation (9) above, using  1 1 1 π + = P  and noting that 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 1 2 π π φ + + = + + i r . 
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Notice that higher inflation in s=1 reduces the debt repayment in that state.  In contrast, higher 
inflation in s = 1 increases the debt repayment in the state where the pegged exchange rate is 
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The inflation is characterized by      ] ; ; ) 1 ( ; [ 2 1 1 ε π π k D r T + =
+ − + −
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Figure 2 captures a simulation of this quadratic example.  The solid upward sloping curve 
reports the association between total debt (D) and inflation.  The dotted, downward sloping curve 
reports the association between the debt and the share of domestic currency debt, x.  For low debt, 
the inflation rate is zero in all states of nature.  For debt above 0.163 and below 0.203 the 
inflation rate in state one increase with the debt, and the entire debt is domestic currency 
denominated. Higher expected inflation increases the cost of serving the domestic currency debt 
in state 2.  At a critical debt [about D = 0.203], the inflation in state 1 and the debt are high 
enough to “bump” the fiscal constraint in state 2 for x = 1.  Increasing the debt above that 
threshold requires lowering the share of the domestic currency debt and higher inflation.  Above 
that threshold, the marginal impact of debt on inflation is larger than below the threshold.  At debt 
level of about 0.236 the inflation in s = 1 reaches the level maximizing seignorage revenue in that 
state (π = 1), reaching the debt ceiling associated with j = 1.  Allowing for foreign currency debt 
increases the debt ceiling, yet it comes with a cost – a rapid increase in inflation.  
  Our model can be readily extended to allow for endogenous determination of taxes.  
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where χ is the indicator function, having a value of one if devaluation takes place in state s, and 
zero otherwise; 0 measures the welfare cost of inflation as a fraction of the GDP; and  m c 5 . s δ is 
the productivity shock in state s.  This specification recognizes that devaluation is associated with   18
a cost d, in addition to the direct costs of inflation [see Obstfeld (1996) for further discussion].  
The actual tax rate and inflation rate in state s are determined by maximizing the second period 
utility subject to the budget constraint.  For our two state of nature example discussed above, in 
the range associated with x < 1 in state s = 1, the budget constraints are 
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The authorities determine the tax rate and the inflation in s = 1 ( 1 1;π t ) by maximizing (20) 
subject to the appropriate budget constraint (the first line in 21).  The resultant association 
between the inflation and the tax rate in s = 1 is positive and non-linear: 
  













The resultant equilibrium is similar to the one described in Figure 2, with the modification that in 
state 1 the tax rate and the inflation rate are endogenously determined.  
 
Balance sheet surprises 
 
Revisiting equation (12) for the endogenous seignorage case, we note that a rise in state 1 
inflation will have three effects: (i) state 1 seignorage will increase; (ii) so will peso interest rates; 
and (iii) the size of the capital loss (gain to the government) on peso debt for given D and x will 
rise.  Letting FS1 denote state 1 fiscal surplus (LHS of (12) a. with endogenous seignorage minus 
RHS), its derivative with respect to state 1 inflation is: 
 (23)  ]
) 1 (
1
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The first term on the RHS captures (i) above, while the second term is the net effect of (ii) and 
(iii).  Given the concavity of  1 σ (.), it is obvious from (23) that the level of state 1 inflation that   19
would maximize state 1 fiscal surplus will exceed the seignorage maximizing level because of the 
additional capital loss on peso debt.  Now suppose that there is unanticipated fiscal cost 
associated with a devaluation (and hence inflation).  This can be thought of as a bailout induced 
by political pressure, forcing the government to support the banking system to make its balance 
sheet whole.  Let β(π1) denote the size of the resultant fiscal cost.   We assume reasonably that the 
size of this unanticipated balance sheet problem increases linearly  with state 1 inflation, as for 
any given balance sheet mismatch, the situation would be worse with a larger devaluation.  In 
Figure 3,  ) ( 1 π Γ  depicts the sum of seignorage revenues and the capital loss on peso debt and 
) ( 1 π β the fiscal cost of the balance sheet problem.  Even though  1 π  maximizes seignorage plus 
the capital loss, the government will want to avoid a “free-fall” of the exchange rate above 
1 1 ( π + ) because of the balance sheet problem.  If now it turns out that  ) ( 1 1 π FS <0, devaluation 
will not suffice to restore fiscal solvency in state 1 and in this case, a default and debt 
restructuring may become inevitable.  In this case, if the private sector is expecting state 1 
inflation to exceed  1 π (because it does not anticipate the magnitude of the balance sheet 
problem), the period 1 differential interest differential  ) ( r i −  would be very high and a swap to 







), increasing the need for a debt reduction or default. 
 
Interpretation of Russian and Argentine Experience 
 
The debt swaps in Russia 1998 and Argentina 2001 took place in the following 
circumstances: (i) market perceptions of default risk were high and debt rollovers were a 
problem.  Bond spreads were in excess of 700 basis points for the few months preceding the 
swap, and the swaps were concluded at spreads of slightly less than 1000 basis points (Russia) or 
exceeding it (Argentina).  Such spreads have almost invariably portended eventual crisis – a large 
devaluation at least as in Russia 1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey 2001, Argentina 2001, if not default 
as well as in Russia and Argentina; (ii) public debt was on an unsustainable course and growth 
was flagging; and (iii) the IFIs were putting together rescue packages with a combination of 
fiscal-structural reforms and liquidity enhancing loans.  In other words there was a determined 
effort to overcome negative market sentiment and save the fixed exchange rate peg. 
   20
  We return to Figure 2 to interpret the Russian and Argentine experience.  Ignoring the 
balance sheet problem for the moment, Figure 2 has a straightforward interpretation: when total 
debt is low, currency composition may not matter and all the debt can be held in pesos.  However, 
as debt grows fiscal solvency in the bad state (low growth and taxes) may become a problem and 
beyond a point like A in Figure 2, a bad state devaluation will be needed to restore solvency in 
that state.  This will raise peso interest rates, an effect that will be offset by higher seignorage plus 
capital losses on peso debt through devaluation (which we shall refer to collectively as the 
inflation tax) should the bad state materialize, but reduce the good state fiscal surplus because the 
exchange rate remains pegged in this state.  The shadow exchange rate will rise.  As debt 
continues to rise and reaches the point B in Figure 2, the fiscal surplus in the good state 
disappears because of the growing peso-dollar interest differential.  Beyond B, solvency requires 
both a fall in the share of peso debt, and a faster rate of devaluation in the bad state because the 
base of the inflation tax shrinks.  This further widens the peso-dollar interest differential.  If a 
swap is attempted in these circumstances, it will push inflation towards the seignorage 
maximizing rate and could precipitate the collapse of the fixed peg.  Hence, the authorities may 
find it more attractive to dilute the burden of public debt by levying a capital tax on holders of its 
debt.  A partial default would reduce expected inflation.   
 
Consider now a case where D is very high and x is small, i.e., public debt is high and 
dollarized as in the case of  Argentina so that the base for the inflation tax is low.  In this case a 
currency swap (lowering peso debt) may not help much, as it would rapidly raise bad state 
inflation – which might explain the debate over “pesifying” dollar liabilities in Argentina.
23  It is a 
way of raising the base of the inflation tax and lowering expected inflation.  If at the same time 
there is a balance sheet problem, then the only way to restore fiscal solvency might be through a 
debt write down.  In the Russian case, D was also high, but x at 0.3 was also relatively high.  With 
a very high ruble-dollar interest differential, a swap appeared attractive, but according to the 
model would only make matters worse by increasing bad state inflation and hence the interest 
differential.  It would also raise the shadow exchange rate and trigger a speculative attack.  While 
there were other factors also at play in Russia – such as the liquidity injection to reserves in the 
form of senior IFI loans and the interaction of the swap with bank balance sheets as discussed 
above - the developments after the swap conform to the predictions of our model.    
 
                                                 
23 See for example de la Torre and Schmukler (2002).   21
A puzzle that remains is why creditors let debt levels go up to such high levels in the first 
place.  As noted above, there were factors at play both in Argentina and Russia which made 
public debt dynamics look much better than they actually were.  Another possibility is that the 
probability of a bad state went up, in Russia’s case because of the East Asian crisis and falling oil 
prices, and in Argentina’s case because of contagion from both Russia and Brazil.  This would 
lower what are regarded as sustainable public debt levels and raise both the size of expected 
devaluation and domestic interest rates.  This may strengthen the motivation for a swap out of 
domestic debt; but this will only make matters worse for the bad state to which a higher 




  Our model tries to explain why debt swaps do not work when fiscal fundamentals are 
weak in spite of their intuitive appeal.  In so doing, it sheds light on the fundamental nature of the 
macroeconomic crises that Russia and Argentina experienced.  The model combines in a simple 
way the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government with the arbitrage-based pricing of 
peso and dollar debt in the context of a pegged exchange rate.  It shows that attempts to lower the 
share of high-yielding peso debt would help in good states where taxes are adequate to service 
debt and the peg remains intact; but hurt in bad states where taxes need to be augmented by the 
inflation tax and a devaluation is needed to restore fiscal solvency.  In other words, instead of 
protecting the peg, the swap increases the expected rate of devaluation which in turn could hasten 
its abandonment.  The first part is analogous to the Sargent-Wallace argument, whereby tighter 
money actually raises expected inflation given an underlying fiscal imbalance and growing 
indebtedness.  The second part flows from the observation that the increase in domestic interest 
rates linked to the rise of the expected rate of devaluation lowers the demand for money, raising 
the shadow exchange rate.  If this rises sufficiently fast and exceeds the level of the fixed peg, it 
will prompt a speculative attack a la Krugman-Flood-Garber.   
 
  So then why are swaps included as part of rescue packages?  We note two possibilities: 
first, there may be a belief that an interest rate arbitrage is available, i.e., that Fisher parity does 
not hold.  Second, the government may believe that as a result of the IFI rescue and reforms 
package it can dramatically lower the probability of a bad state.  In other words, the reduction in 
the share of peso debt is accompanied by a fall in the probability of the bad state so that  expected 
devaluation does not go up and peso interest rates could even fall, setting of a virtuous cycle of   22
higher growth and falling interest rates.
24  Our paper argues that the chances this will happen 
given high public debt and bad fiscal fundamentals are low at best.  But  these are precisely the 
circumstances in which countries that undertake the swap as a last resort, hoping to avoid a 
meltdown.  Consequently, our model implies that swaps may have harmful effects precisely in the 
circumstances when they tend to be implemented as part of a rescue package.  The very fact that 
the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint is binding means the market has already 
factored in the possibility of correcting the fiscal fundamentals and found them inadequate.   In 
these situations, attempting to shore up liquidity by a combination of liquidity injections from the 
IFIs (which means a matching increase in public debt, and more senior debt at that) and debt 
swaps then only worsens further the fiscal situation in the eyes of the private sector. Indeed, it 
may also raise the specter of moral hazard: IFI entry is the best time to exit.
25  The overall 
conclusion is that there is not much IFIs can do when default risk reaches a certain point, and 
non-market based debt restructuring may be the only option.   
 
  Our model abstracted from several important issues.  Among the topics left for 
extensions: 
•  Adding non-traded goods.  This will allow us to understand the impact of real exchange rate 
adjustments on the exposure to crisis, and to evaluation the balance sheet effects of swaps. 
•  Adding periods, in order to investigate the intertemporal dynamics leading to a crisis.  
•  Moral hazard associated with swaps may be added by introducing an IFI loan that goes into 
reserves; it does not change the net debt position of the government, but could worsen the 
fiscal situation if reserves carry a lower interest rate than IFI loans and “demote” other loans 
if IFI loans are senior.  This extension will provide a linkage between our model and the third 
generation models of crises. 
                                                 
24 This follows directly from Fisher interest parity.    
25 This point is made forcefully in the Russian case of 1998 by Kharas et al. (2001).   23
Appendix 
 
This appendix extends the model of debt swaps to the case in which the government 
chooses its fiscal, financial and monetary policies to maximize a social welfare function.  It first 
presents some completion of the analysis in the text.  As before, the government collects tax and 
seignorage revenues to meet its debt repayment obligations, and we abstract from other aspects of 
fiscal policy, such as public non-interest expenditures.  Taxes are implicitly distortionary, and the 
output cost of taxation is assumed to be increasing in tax revenue raised. Authorities also have an 
objective function representing social preferences that is decreasing in net tax revenue and in the 
inflation rate. The cost of taxation varies with an exogenous state of nature, representing the idea 
that output is subject to stochastic disturbances and the marginal cost of tax revenue declines with 
output.  The government will also be allowed to default on debt (but sovereign default is costly). 
 
1. The general model of debt swaps 
We begin with the mechanics of debt exchanges in the basic model and develop our 
analysis by extending the model. For now, the government cannot default on foreign currency 
debt and has already reached its capacity to repay.  There are two dates and N states of nature in 
the second period, such that T .    N T T < < < ... 2 1
Fisher interest parity,  
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where b is the outstanding stock of dollar debt and B is the outstanding stock of peso debt.  We 
rewrite this constraint to obtain the expressions used in the text, as 
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where D=b+B and x is the proportion of outstanding debt issued in domestic currency at the end 
of period 1.  When these inequalities are binding, they solve for the minimum state-contingent 
devaluation necessary to maintain government solvency, so that they give the solution for a 
government that is inflation-averse and is constrained not to default. 
  For the exogenous seignorage revenues case, the j+1 conditions, 
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determine the j+1 variables,  , and D given x.  Calculating total expected revenues, we 
have 
j P P,..., 1
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so that D is independent of x.  Changing x only affects the post-devaluation price levels and not 
the capacity of the government to service its debt or avoid devaluation.  
  For the case of endogenous seignorage revenues, the conditions for solvency are 
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These, now j+2 equations in j+2 variables, solve for x as a function of D.  A decrease in x leads to 
a rise in   for s less than j+1.  This increases seignorage revenues on the left-hand side of 
equation (a7) as long as 
s P
0 ) ( ' > s s P σ .  Equation (a9) shows that this allows an increase in D 
subject to the no-default constraint.  In this case, the nominal interest rate does not increase by as 
much as in the exogenous seignorage case, so that equation (a8) will continue to be satisfied with 
a lower x and higher D.  When D is maximized,  0 ) ( ' = s s P σ , for at least one state s less than 
j+1.  
 
2. Endogenizing fiscal and monetary policy 
  Policy objectives for the government can be introduced as marginal costs of distortionary 
taxes and inflation.  The social costs of distortionary taxes and of inflation are assumed to be 
additively separable and are represented by the two functions,   and v , respectively, 
where   and v  are each positive and increasing in their respective arguments.  For 
any given values of T and P, respectively, these marginal costs are assumed to be decreasing in s.  
There will also be an upper bound on the tax revenue that the government can raise in any state, 
) ( s s T w ) ( s s P
) ( ' s s T w ) ( ' s s P
s T .  For convenience, we assume that  ∞ =
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.  To represent the government's 
incentive to keep the exchange rate fixed in some states, a fixed cost, d, to depreciating at any rate 
is also adopted.  
The government chooses it contingent policy to minimize its loss function, 
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subject to the constraints 
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( φ φ .  The solvency condition, equation (a9) also holds in this 
equilibrium.  Condition (a14) is tax smoothing; note that conditions (a13) and (a14) imply that the 








, is also smoothed across all states s = 1,…, j.  The 
choice of state j is determined by comparing   to w ) ˆ ( s s T w d P v T s s s s + + ) ( ) (  for states j and j+1 
where T  is the tax revenue required if the price level is fixed equal to one and T  is the tax 
revenue required when the price level exceeds one and satisfies the first-order condition (a13).  
Seignorage revenues are not maximized in any state in equilibrium here; that is, 
s ˆ
s
0 ) ( ' > s s P σ .  
  This optimization problem solves for the probability that the exchange rate peg lasts 
through the second period,  , the allocation of debt across currencies, x, and the trade-off 
between conventional taxes and inflation taxes conditional on abandoning the exchange rate peg.  
This solution implicitly assumes that the shadow exchange rate in period 1 is less than one so that 
the peg can be maintained with positive probability in period 2.  We can also observe that the 
upper bound for outstanding debt, D, is reached when j+1=N, although this will exceed the 









3. Sovereign defaults 
  Under sovereign immunity, governments have the incentive to make debt payments 
because they face the possibility of indirect sanctions for not doing so. These sanctions usually 
take the form of reduced access to foreign trade or international credit markets. In models of 
sovereign debt, the costs of default are limited, so that there are upper bounds on the repayments 
that a government will make. These can be state contingent and lead to debt limits. Our model 
already incorporates upper bounds on the willingness of the government to raise taxes for debt 
repayments given by the  s T . It is also realistic to bound seignorage revenues from above. 
Models of equilibrium debt renegotiation (for example, Kletzer and Wright [2000] or 
Bulow and Rogoff [1989]) imply that debt repayments will be increasing with output. These are 
game theoretic models with discrete punishments for deviation from equilibrium. A very simple 
way to incorporate the renegotiation or restructuring of sovereign debt repayments is to add a 
fixed cost of debt repudiation, f. Under this assumption, the government is willing to raise 
revenues through either conventional distortionary taxes or seignorage for debt service that satisfy 
 (a17)  ws( ,  f Ts ≤ )
under the fixed exchange rate regime, or   26
 (a18)  ws( ,  f P v T s s s ≤ + ) ( )
under the floating exchange rate regime.  If the government devalues, it incurs the cost d, whether 
it repudiates its debts subsequently or not.  These inequalities impose upper bounds on T  that are 
state-contingent and increasing with the state of nature under the fixed rate.  Under a float, the 
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  If the outstanding debt is sufficiently large, actual debt repayments will be state 
contingent under sovereign risk. For example, under a revocable fixed exchange rate, the gross 
yield on debt would be state contingent and given by 
 (a19)  T ( =   D rs s ) 1+
where   and the level of debt satisfies   f T w s s = ) (
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Under the float, the constraint 
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= .   
Condition (a21) is written for the case that foreign currency and domestic currency debt 
payments are renegotiated in proportion to face value.  In the case that repayments to domestic 
currency debt are unilaterally reduced with no default on foreign currency debt, post-devaluation 
inflation is lower and the repayment constraint for state s is given by 
(a22) 
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The possibility that only foreign debt is renegotiated (realizes state-contingent yields) is 
analogous.  
  The presence of sovereign risk will change the effects of debt swaps if the sovereignty 
immunity constraints are binding in at least some states of nature. Consider a case in which the 
sovereign immunity constraints are binding in states such that the government abandons the peg 










=  for each of these states.  A swap of domestic currency debt for foreign 
currency debt will not lead to an increase in  for each of these states, but, instead, equation 
















, rises as T ) s P ( s s σ +  remains constant.  For states s = j+1,…., N, the 
swap reduces payments to creditors,   


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However, the constraints for these states include 
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s s s σ + T , 
which implies that r , for s = j+1,…, N, can increase without violating the sovereign immunity 
constraints so that the foreign currency value of debt repayments is unchanged in any state of 
nature.  The debt swap has no effect on the real value of repayments in this case and provides no 
benefits.   
s
It does not matter if the sovereign immunity constraint is binding or not for any state, s = 
j+1,…, N for this conclusion to hold.  If, however, the constraint does not bind for some state s = 
1,…, j, then the debt swap leads to an increase in the price level,  , in this state.  The result 
parallels the case of a debt swap without the possibility of sovereign default (since the default 
constraint does not bind).  A swap then leads to a rise in the shadow exchange rate and tightens 
the sovereign immunity constraint so that it might bind after the swap.  An alternative assumption 
is that it is costly for the government to renegotiate its debt and that these costs are rising in the 
amount of debt repayment reduction achieved.  In this case, a debt swap will lead to an increase 
in both T  and   in states for which the government depreciates.  
s P
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Exogenous seignorage, inflation in state s = 1 and total debt, for a give share of domestic 
currency debt (x).  
  
The simulation corresponds to the case of N =2, j =1, T2 = 0.2, T1 = 0.16, r =0, φ1 = 0.6. 
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The association between inflation in state s = 1 & the share of domestic currency debt (x) with 
aggregate debt, D.  
  
The simulation corresponds to the case of N =2, j =1, b=1, k = 0.2, T2 = 0.25, r =0,          ε =0.35, 
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